

CIA/OCI/BRIEF 177-75
17 NOVEMBER 1975

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• EUROPEAN BRIEF 177.75Y

1. PORTUGAL: MORE THAN 20,000 COMMUNISTS AND THEIR ALLIES MARCHED THROUGH THE STREETS OF LISBON SUNDAY NIGHT, BUT THEY DISPERSED PEACEFULLY WITH NO SIGN OF THE "INSURRECTION" PREDICTED BY THE SOCIALISTS AND POPULAR DEMOCRATS.⁴

AT THE RALLY, THE COMMUNISTS USED THE "SPECULATIVE FEARS" OF THE ANTI-COMMUNIST PARTIES TO PLAY UP THEIR "FIRM RESOLVE TO ADVANCE TOWARD SOCIALISM." DESPITE CALLS FROM THE CROWD FOR THE OVERTHROW OF PRIME MINISTER AZEVEDO AND THE RETURN OF PRO-COMMUNIST FORMER PRIME MINISTER GONCALVES, MOST COMMUNISTS ARE PROBABLY WILLING TO SETTLE FOR A GOVERNMENT SHAKEUP THAT WOULD RETURN COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZERS TO ADVANTAGEOUS POSITIONS IN THE CABINET AND IN THE ALL-MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. IN THIS WAY, THE PARTY CAN AVOID THE RIGHT-WING BACKLASH THAT WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY FOLLOW A COMMUNIST-LED COUP ATTEMPT.⁴

ONE SPEAKER AT THE RALLY DECLARED, "WE DIDN'T COME HERE TO ASSAULT THE GOVERNMENT, BUT TO DEMAND A TRANSFER OF

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POWER." PARTY LEADER CUNHAL, WHO BEGAN AN EAST EUROPEAN TOUR SATURDAY, RESPONDED TO SOCIALIST AND POPULAR DEMOCRATIC CHARGES IN HUNGARY, INSISTING THAT THE COMMUNISTS DO NOT PLAN TO TAKE POWER BY FORCE.⁴

IN CONTRAST, A RIVAL DEMONSTRATION IN THE NORTHERN TOWN OF VISEU TO SHOW SUPPORT FOR THE AZEVEDO GOVERNMENT WAS MARRED BY DISSENSION BETWEEN THE MAJOR DEMOCRATIC PARTIES. SOCIALIST LEADER SOARES PULLED HIS PARTY OUT OF THE RALLY AT THE LAST MINUTE. SOARES CHARGED THAT THE CENTER-LEFT POPULAR DEMOCRATS WERE TRYING TO USE THE GATHERING FOR PARTISAN PURPOSES BY INSISTING THAT PARTY HEAD SA CARNEIRO--WHO HOLDS NO GOVERNMENT POSITION--SPEAK AT THE RALLY. THE SOCIALISTS ARE WARY OF BECOMING TOO CLOSE TO THE POPULAR DEMOCRATS AND LOSING PART OF THEIR BASE OF SUPPORT, EITHER TO THE LEFT OR TO THE RIGHT.⁴

A CROWD OF 15,000 TURNED OUT IN VISEU DESPITE THE SOCIALIST BOYCOTT. LABOR MINISTER TOMAS ROSA SPOKE FOR PRIME MINISTER AZEVEDO, WHO REMAINED IN LISBON TO REST UP AFTER THE 36-HOUR SIEGE OF HIS RESIDENCE LAST WEEK BY CONSTRUCTION

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WORKERS. TOMAS ROSA CONDEMNED THE WORKERS' STRIKE AND PROMISED THE CROWD THAT "THE GOVERNMENT WILL NOT GIVE WAY" TO THE WORKERS, WHO ARE BEING MANIPULATED BY POLITICALLY MOTIVATED LEADERS.⁴

THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT TOMAS ROSA'S HINT THAT THE GOVERNMENT MAY BE ABLE TO SAVE SOME FACE BY NOT GRANTING ALL THE WORKERS' DEMANDS. AZEVEDO REPORTEDLY TOLD POPULAR DEMOCRATIC LEADERS THAT NO OVERALL AGREEMENT WAS REACHED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, ALTHOUGH THE PRO-COMMUNIST PRESS HAS PLAYED THE INCIDENT AS A TOTAL VICTORY. THE GOVERNMENT DID TEMPORARILY ACCEPT THE UNION'S PROPOSED WAGE SCALE--AN AVERAGE INCREASE OF 28 PERCENT--BUT DEMANDS FOR IMPROVED WORKING CONDITIONS AND AN INQUIRY INTO THE LABOR MINISTRY ARE STILL OPEN TO QUESTION.⁴

MEANWHILE, INCREASED LEFT-WING ACTIVITY IN LISBON IS ONCE AGAIN HAVING AN IMPACT IN THE AZORES. THE SIX-MAN REGIONAL JUNTA ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE ON SATURDAY DEMANDING THAT MAINLAND SECURITY TROOPS SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT. THE JUNTA WARNED THAT IF THE PRESENT INDISCIPLINE CONTINUES, THE AZORES WILL REFUSE TO

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SUBMIT TO A GOVERNMENT IN A "STATE OF ANARCHY" AND WILL REJECT ANY MAINLAND GOVERNMENT THAT DOES NOT REPRESENT THE WILL OF THE MAJORITY. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INFORMATION FERREIRA DA CUNHA--WHO IS IN THE AZORES TO ESCAPE LEFT-WING PRESSURE FOR HIM TO RESIGN--REPORTED THAT HE HELPED DRAFT THE DOCUMENT.⁴

APPEALS FOR MILITARY DISCIPLINE ARE UNLIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE, HOWEVER, SO LONG AS GENERAL CARVALHO IS IN A POSITION OF INFLUENCE. THE REMOVAL OF CARVALHO AS COMMANDER OF THE LISBON MILITARY REGION AND HIS REPLACEMENT BY ANTI-COMMUNIST CAPTAIN VASCO LOURENCO REPORTEDLY WAS DISCUSSED LAST SATURDAY AT A MEETING OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. A FINAL DECISION ON CARVALHO'S REMOVAL HAS BEEN POSTPONED.⁴

CARVALHO'S OUSTER IS BEING PUSHED BY FOREIGN MINISTER ANTUNES' ANTI-COMMUNIST FACTION. ITS SUCCESS PROBABLY LIES IN THE HANDS OF PRESIDENT COSTA GOMES, WHO HAS BEEN HESITANT TO REMOVE RADICAL OFFICERS FROM HIGH POSITIONS. POSSIBLY TO GAIN COSTA GOMES' ASSENT, THE ANTUNES GROUP MAY TRY TO "KICK CARVALHO UPSTAIRS" TO THE POSITION OF VICE CHIEF OF STAFF OF

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- THE ARMED FORCES IN ORDER TO REMOVE HIM FROM DIRECT CONTACT WITH RADICAL TROOPS. {CONFIDENTIAL} 1 4
- 2. SPAIN: PRINCE JUAN CARLOS IS EXTRACTING MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE OUT OF HIS STATUS AS "TEMPORARY" HEAD OF STATE. 4

CAPITALIZING ON THE EMERGENCY NATURE OF THE SAHARA PROBLEM, HE HAS ACTED DECISIVELY AND IS GIVEN MUCH OF THE CREDIT FOR REVERSING THE MOROCCAN MARCH. HIS LEADERSHIP IMAGE HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED BY HIS CHAIRING OF TWO NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL MEETINGS--SOMETHING FRANCO RARELY DID. JUAN CARLOS' HANDLING OF THE SAHARA ISSUE TO DATE HAS ALSO IMPROVED HIS RAPPORT WITH TOP MILITARY LEADERS WHOSE SUPPORT HE WILL NEED IN THE MONTHS TO COME. 4

ALTHOUGH JUAN CARLOS HAS NOT BEEN AS ASSERTIVE ON DOMESTIC ISSUES, FRANCO'S CONTINUED PRESENCE HAS GIVEN THE PRINCE AN EXCUSE NOT TO BE. EVEN SO, THE MEDIA HAVE APPLAUDED JUAN CARLOS FOR THE RECENT INDICATIONS THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS TAKING STEPS TO RESOLVE THE SENSITIVE ISSUE OF REGIONALISM. ON NOVEMBER 11 THE CABINET ADOPTED A DECREE--INITIATED SEVERAL MONTHS AGO--SETTING UP A

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COMMISSION TO PREPARE A SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE STATUTE FOR TWO OF THE BASQUE PROVINCES. THE MEASURE INDICATES THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS THINKING OF POLITICAL MEANS--RATHER THAN REPRESSION--TO COPE WITH THE BASQUE PROBLEM. THE PRESS HAS ALSO REPORTED THAT A DECREE APPROVED LAST MAY AUTHORIZING THE TEACHING OF REGIONAL LANGUAGES IN SCHOOLS AND THEIR USE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES WILL ALSO BE ISSUED SOON.4

IN GENERAL, HOWEVER, THERE IS A PARALYSIS IN DOMESTIC POLICY-MAKING WHICH WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE AS LONG AS FRANCO LIVES. DURING THE INTERREGNUM THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ULTRA RIGHT--IF LEFT UNCHECKED--WILL COMPLICATE JUAN CARLOS' EFFORTS TO OPEN UP SPANISH SOCIETY AFTER HE IS SWORN IN AS KING. BLAS PINAR, LEADER OF THE ULTRA RIGHT NEW FORCE, HAS BEEN HOLDING RALLIES AROUND THE COUNTRY WARNING OF THE DANGERS POSED BY POLITICAL PARTIES. POINTING OUT THAT THE MONARCHY WILL DERIVE ITS LEGITIMACY SOLELY FROM FRANCO, HE HAS CALLED ON JUAN CARLOS TO PURGE THE GOVERNMENT OF ALL WHO HAVE NOT SUPPORTED FRANCOISM.4

RIGHT-WING EXTREMISTS, SUCH AS THE GUERRILLAS OF CHRIST THE

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KING, WHO HAVE BEEN LINKED TO THE NEW FORCE, HAVE RECENTLY BEATEN UP STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS AND OPPOSITION LAWYERS, AND SENT THREATENING LETTERS TO OPPOSITIONISTS AND EVEN TO SOME OF THE MORE OPEN-MINDED ESTABLISHMENT FIGURES.4

SECURITY FORCES, MEANWHILE, HAVE TAKEN FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE WIDE POWERS GRANTED BY LAST SUMMER'S ANTI-TERRORIST DECREES TO STEP UP ARRESTS AND REPRESS ALL FORMS OF DISSENT. IN THE PAST FEW DAYS, ACCORDING TO PRESS ESTIMATES, MORE THAN 100 PEOPLE HAVE BEEN ARRESTED, INCLUDING THE EDITOR OF THE PRESTIGIOUS INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER YAS WHO WAS INDICTED FOR PUBLISHING AN ARTICLE ON THE SUCCESSION. SIX PRIESTS HAVE BEEN FINED BECAUSE OF THEIR SERMONS, AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS BANNED SEVERAL CONFERENCES BY IMPORTANT PROFESSORS, INCLUDING FORMER MINISTER RUIZ GIMENEZ.4

JUAN CARLOS WILL NOT BE ABLE TO POSTPONE DOMESTIC POLICY DECISIONS MUCH LONGER EVEN IF FRANCO LIVES. A DECISION IS DUE ON A SUCCESSOR FOR RODRIGUEZ DE VALCARCEL, THE CONSERVATIVE PRESIDENT OF PARLIAMENT WHOSE SIX-YEAR TERM EXPIRES LATER THIS MONTH. THE POSITION IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE THE INCUMBENT

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AUTOMATICALLY BECOMES PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF THE REALM, WHICH IS INSTRUMENTAL IN THE CHOICE OF NEW PRIME MINISTERS, AND THE THREE-MAN COUNCIL OF THE REGENCY, WHICH WILL GOVERN FROM THE TIME OF FRANCO'S DEATH UNTIL JUAN CARLOS IS SWORN IN.⁴

SHOULD JUAN CARLOS DECIDE TO RETAIN RODRIGUEZ DE VALCARCEL, THE DECISION WILL BE INTERPRETED BY THE SPANISH LEFT AS FRANCOISM WITHOUT FRANCO. IF SOMEONE ELSE IS CHOSEN, HIS POLITICAL CREDENTIALS WILL BE CAREFULLY EXAMINED FOR CLUES AS TO THE DIRECTION IN WHICH JUAN CARLOS PLANS TO TAKE SPAIN. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~⁴

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3. USSR: ACCORDING TO AN OFFICIAL AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY

[REDACTED] PARTY BOSS BREZHNEV WILL ATTEND THE NEXT

CONGRESS OF THE POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY WHICH IS SCHEDULED TO BEGIN ON DECEMBER 8. ASSUNING HE GOES, IT WILL BE THE 13TH FOREIGN PARTY CONGRESS TO HIS CREDIT. HE HEADS THE LIST OF FULL MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO PERFORMING THIS CHORE.⁴

SINCE BECOMING GENERAL SECRETARY IN 1964,

BREZHNEV HAS CONCENTRATED ON THE SIX EAST EUROPEAN

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MEMBERS IN MORE OR LESS GOOD STANDING OF THE "SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH", LEAVING "LESS IMPORTANT" CONGRESSES TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO. HE ATTENDED THE ROMANIAN CONGRESS IN 1965, BUT IN 1974 LEFT THE JOB OF REPRESENTING THE CPSU IN BUCHAREST TO KIRILENKO. THAT SAME YEAR, KIRILENKO ALSO ATTENDED THE YUGOSLAV CONGRESS, THUS ENDING THE LONG-STANDING SOVIET PRACTICE OF BOYCOTTING CONGRESSES OF THE YUGOSLAV PARTY. KIRILENKO AND PELSH EACH HAS SIX CONGRESSES UNDER HIS BELT.4

FULL MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO WITH HIGHLY VISIBLE GOVERNMENT POSITIONS DO NOT ATTEND THE CONGRESSES OF FOREIGN PARTIES. ANDROPOV, GRECHKO, GROMYKO, KOSYGIN, MAZUROV, AND PODGORNY HAVE NOT ATTENDED A FOREIGN PARTY CONGRESS IN THE LAST 10 YEARS. (ANDROPOV AND MAZUROV EACH ATTENDED ONE CONGRESS DURING THIS PERIOD, BUT NEITHER AT THE TIME WAS A FULL MEMBER OF THE CPSU POLITBURO.)

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KULAKOV AND POLYANSKY HAVE ALSO ATTENDED NO FOREIGN
 PARTY CONGRESSES. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

4. YUGOSLAVIA-BULGARIA: SOFIA AND BELGRADE HAVE APPARENTLY
 DECIDED TO TRY TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE SEEMINGLY OMNIPRESENT
 PROBLEMS IN THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS. QUICK SOLU-
 TIONS ARE NOT LIKELY, BUT, PROVIDED BOTH SIDES ABIDE
 BY THE NEW SPIRIT OF REASONABLENESS, THERE COULD BE
 A HIATUS IN THE SQUABBLING BETWEEN THE TWO BALKAN
 RIVALS. 4

THE NEW ATTITUDE EMERGED DURING BULGARIAN FOR-
 EIGN MINISTER PETUR MLADENOV'S VISIT TO BELGRADE
 FROM NOVEMBER 31 TO 13. IN TALKS WITH HIS YUGOSLAV
 COUNTERPART MILOS MINIC, MLADENOV APPARENTLY AD-
 DRESSED MAJOR BILATERAL ISSUES, INCLUDING THE SEN-
 SITIVE MACEDONIAN PROBLEM. PRESS ANNOUNCEMENTS RE-
 FERRED TO THE DISCUSSIONS AS "FRINEDLY" AND "FRANK,"
 AND DESCRIBED THE ATMOSPHERE AS ONE OF "FULL OPEN-
 NESS AND READINESS" TO DISCUSS THEIR DIFFICULTIES. 4

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MINIC AND MLADENOV AGREED ON AN EVENTUAL MEETING OF PRESIDENTS TITO AND ZHIVKOV TO DISCUSS "WAYS AND MEANS" FOR RESOLVING THEIR DISPUTES. THE SUMMIT IS, HOWEVER, CLEARLY DEPENDENT ON AN EFFORT BY THE TWO SIDES TO LIMIT POLEMICS.⁴

DURING TOASTS AT OFFICIAL DINNERS IN BELGRADE, BOTH MEN RECITED THEIR DIFFERENCES, BUT SAID THE PROBLEMS SHOULD NOT RULE OUT FUTURE CLOSE COOPERATION IN ALL SPHERES. THE COMMUNIQUE SUMMARIZING THE TALKS ACCENTUATED A MUTUAL DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF "EQUALITY, INDEPENDENCE, RESPECT FOR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY... AND NONINTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS.⁵⁶⁷⁸⁹

THE COMMUNIQUE ATTACHED "EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE" TO MUTUAL EFFORTS TO HARNESS "INFORMATION ACTIVITIES" AS A MEANS OF BUILDING AN ATMOSPHERE OF TRUST. THIS PRESUMABLY MEANS THAT VOCIFEROUS YUGOSLAV PRESS POLEMICS AND THE OCCASIONAL INFLAM-

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MATORY PUBLICATIONS APPEARING IN BULGARIA WILL BE HELD IN CHECK FOR A TIME.⁴

AGREEING TO DISCUSS THEIR DIFFERENCES IS THE MOST PROGRESS TOWARD IMPROVING YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS IN SEVERAL YEARS. A NUMBER OF FACTORS COULD STILL UNDERMINE THESE GOOD INTENTIONS. THE MOST IMMEDIATE THREAT IS THE BULGARIAN CENSUS SCHEDULED FOR DECEMBER, WHICH WILL, BELGRADE FEARS, OMIT A CATEGORY FOR MACEDONIANS. JOINTLY CLAIMED CULTURAL HEROES, THE ROLE OF THE BULGARIAN MILITARY IN "LIBERATING" YUGOSLAVIA DURING WORLD WAR II, AND BELGRADE'S MARINERS OF SOFIA AS A STAND-IN FOR SOVIET INTERESTS ALL OFFER HOTHEADS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER OPPORTUNITIES TO SCOTCH ANY PROGRESS.⁴

ON BALKAN COOPERATION AND THE PROPOSED CARMANLIS CONFERENCE, THE TWO SEEM TO BE MOVING CLOSER TOGETHER. STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF BILATERAL COOPERATION, MINIC AND MLADENOV SUPPORTED MULTILAT-

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ERAL EFFORTS "ONLY IN THOSE FIELDS THAT ARE REALLY
ACCEPTABLE AND OF INTERECT TO THE BALKAN COUNTRIES."
SOFIA HAD DECLARED IT IS AGAINST ANY MULTILATERAL
ACTIVITY OF A POLITICAL NATURE, AND BELGRADE HAS
EMPHASIZED THAT IT IS PREMATURE EVEN TO CONSIDER
AMBITIONUS INTER-BALKAN TIES. (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. ROMANIA: IN AN UNPRECENDENTED MOVE, BUCHAREST HAS PUBLICLY
REVEALED THAT A MILITARY OFFICER HAS COMMITTED SERIOUS SABOTAGE.⁴

ON OCTOBER 28, THE PARTY DAILY SCINTEIA CARRIED A BRIEF
ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE DEATH SENTENCE FOR SABOTAGE AGAINST NAVY
COMMANDER MIHAI RUSU HAD BEEN COMMUTED BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE TO 15
TO 20 YEARS IN PRISON.⁴

THERE IS NOT LIKELY TO BE ANY FURTHER PUBLICITY ON THE CASE,
AND THE GOSSIP-LOVING ROMANIANS WILL PROBABLY SEE THE REAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STORY IN THE QUESTIONS IT LEAVES UNANSWERED. THEY
WILL WONDER--AS DO WE--ABOUT WHY PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU GRANTED EXECU-
TIVE CLEMENCY TO A SERVING OFFICER WHOSE CRIME WARRANTED THE FIRING
SQUAD. THERE WILL SURELY BE SPECULATION ABOUT WHAT RUSU DID AND

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WHETHER HE ACTED ALONE OR ON BEHALF OF OTHERS--ROMANIAN OR FOREIGN. 4

STORIES OF SABOTAGE PERIODICALLY CIRCULATE IN BUCHAREST. A FLURRY OF RUMORS ABOUT SABOTAGE BY UNHAPPY INDUSTRIAL WORKERS A LITTLE MORE THAN A YEAR AGO CENTERED ON POOR WORKING CONDITIONS IN FACTORIES. NONE OF THEM MENTIONED MILITARY MEN OR ANY KIND OF DESTRUCTION AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. {CONFIDENTIAL}4

b. EUROPEAN PARTY CONFERENCE: A RECENT ARTICLE ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM IN THE SLOVAK PARTY DAILY, PRVDA, MAY FURTHER ROIL THE TROUBLED WATERS SURROUNDING THE PREPARATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE {ECPG}. IT ALSO DEMONSTRATES THE WIDENING GULF BETWEEN THE LOYALIST AND INDEPENDENT WINGS OF THE MOVEMENT. 4

WRITTEN BY IVAN HLIVKA, THE SLOVAK MEDIA'S CHIEF COMMENTATOR ON THE ECPG, THE ARTICLE REFLECTS FRUSTRATION WITH THE FOOTDRAGGING THAT HAS REPEATEDLY DELAYED THE PROJECT. IT IS SUBSTANTIALLY HARSHER THAN ONE HLIVKA PUBLISHED IN FEBRUARY. INDEPENDENT-MINDED PARTIES, WHICH ARE SUBJECTED TO A THINLY VEILED ATTACK IN THE ARTICLE, WILL UNDOUBT- EDLY BE TEMPTED TO RESPOND IN KIND. 4

IN A DIRECT SLAP AT THE FRENCH, ITALIAN, AND SPANISH PARTIES,

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HLIVKA ECHOES THE ZARODOV LINE, BLASTING THE ADOPTION OF "NEUTRALISM" BY NON-RULING COMMUNIST PARTIES IN ORDER TO COURT THE FAVOR OF NATIONAL ELECTORATES. SUCH INDEPENDENT POSTURING AND "DISASSOCIATION FROM THE COMMON FIGHT," HE ARGUES, CARRIES "THE DANGER OF SLIPPING INTO NATIONALISM." HE ALSO WARNS AGAINST DIVISIVE BOURGEOIS TACTICS AIMED AT MISLEADING COMMUNISTS INTO PUBLICLY "PROVING THAT THEY ARE INDEPENDENT OF MOSCOW." 4

IN A POTSHOT AT THE ROMANIAN AND YUGOSLAV PARTIES, HLIVKA ASSERTS THAT THE "OLD OPPORTUNISM" IS CONSTANTLY STRIVING TO STRENGTHEN ITSELF WITH NEW, "MODERN" ARGUMENTS AND METHODS OF STRUGGLE. HE SAYS THE BASIS OF THIS APPROACH--NATIONALISM--IS THE MOST DANGEROUS WEAPON OF ANTI-COMMUNIST STRATEGY. 4

HLIVKA FLATLY REJECTS THE YUGOSLAV AND ROMANIAN VIEW THAT THE COMINTERN RODE ROUGHSHOD OVER THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL PARTIES IN DEFERENCE TO MOSCOW'S "NARROW NATIONAL" INTERESTS. ALL SUCH ATTACKS ON PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM, HE CONTENDS, ARE "INTENDED TO EVOKE AVERSION" TO UNITED ACTION BY THE MOVEMENT. 4

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THE INDEPENDENT PARTIES MAY PICK UP THE GAUNTLET THROWN DOWN BY
HLIVKA AT THE NEXT SESSION OF THE DRAFTING COMMISSION TO BE
CONVENED SOON IN EAST BERLIN. {CONFIDENTIAL}4 E-2, IMPDET-H

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MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF 177-75.4

1. SPANISH SAHARA: SPANISH CONSULTATIONS WITH ALGERIA OVER THE WEEKEND ON THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT WORKED OUT LAST WEEK ON SPANISH SAHARA APPARENTLY DID NOTHING TO OVERCOME ALGERIAN OPPOSITION TO THE ACCORD.4

NEITHER THE SPANISH NOR THE ALGERIANS HAVE COMMENTED ON THE TALKS HELD SATURDAY IN ALGIERS BETWEEN MADRID'S SPECIAL ENVOY, MINISTER OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING CANO, AND ALGERIAN OFFICIALS. THIS SUGGESTS THE DISCUSSIONS DID NOT GO WELL.4

CANO REPORTEDLY WAS RECEIVED COOLLY AND DID NOT MEET WITH PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE AS HE REPORTEDLY HAD EXPECTED.4

AN ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT PRESS SERVICE STATEMENT ON SUNDAY STRONGLY DENOUNCED SPAIN'S AGREEMENT WITH MOROCCO AND MAURITANIA AS A CALLOUS MOVE TO DIVIDE SPANISH SAHARA'S MINERAL RICHES AND TO DENY THE TERRITORY'S INHABITANTS THE RIGHT TO DECIDE ON THEIR OWN FUTURE.4

2. THE SAHARAN PRO-INDEPENDENCE POLISARIO FRONT ALSO VIGOROUSLY ATTACKED THE AGREEMENT OVER THE WEEKEND AS A VIOLATION OF UN

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RESOLUTIONS ON THE SPANISH SAHARA QUESTION AND A DENIAL OF THE
 RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. THE FRONT CALLED ON THE UN TO
 SEND AN OBSERVER MISSION TO OBSERVE ITS CONTROL OVER THE TERRITORY. 4

ALGIERS WILL PROBABLY LAUNCH ITS CAMPAIGN THIS WEEK TO
 ENLIST SUPPORT IN THE UN TO REVERSE THE AGREEMENT. 4

X1X

ACCORDING TO ██████████ ALGERIA IS ALREADY THREATENING
 TO REQUEST A SPECIAL SECURITY COUNCIL SESSION TO TAKE UP THE
 MATTER AS SOON AS THE TERMS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT ARE MADE
 PUBLIC. THIS IS EXPECTED ONCE THE SPANISH PARLIAMENT COM-
 PLETES THE PROCESS--SCHEDULED TO START ON TUESDAY--OF FORMALLY
 DECOLONIZING THE TERRITORY. 4

BOTH SIDES WILL LOBBY VIGOROUSLY IN THE UN. MOROCCAN
 FOREIGN MINISTER LARAKI ARRIVED IN NEW YORK ON SUNDAY AND,
 TOGETHER WITH HIS MAURITANIAN COUNTERPART WHO IS EXPECTED TO
 ARRIVE SHORTLY, WILL ORCHESTRATE EFFORTS TO NEUTRALIZE THE
 ALGERIAN CAMPAIGN. 4

ALGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER BOUTEFLIKA HAS ALREADY BEEN
 AT THE UN FOR SEVERAL WEEKS, ARGUING THE ALGERIAN CASE FOR A

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SELF-DETERMINATION REFERENDUM UNDER UN AUSPICES FOR SPANISH
SAHARA.4

A SEMIOFFICIAL MOROCCAN DAILY PUBLISHED AN ASSERTION OVER
THE WEEKEND THAT THE SAHARAN ASSEMBLY IS THE REPRESENTATIVE
BODY OF THE SAHARANS. THE ASSERTION SUGGESTS RABAT WILL ARGUE
THAT CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ASSEMBLY--WHICH WILL PRESUMABLY
PROVE RESPONSIVE TO MOROCCAN DIRECTION--ARE ALL THAT IS REQUIRED
TO DETERMINE THE POPULAR WILL, AND THAT A REFERENDUM IS
UNNECESSARY.4

FEW DETAILS OF THE SPANISH-MOROCCAN-MAURITANIAN ACCORD
HAVE YET EMERGED.4

THE MOROCCAN PRESS, CITING INFORMED SOURCES, ASSERTS THAT
THE ACCORD CONTAINS A NUMBER OF DRAFT ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS
CONCERNING THE EXPLOITATION OF MINERALS AND FISHING RIGHTS.
PRESUMABLY, THE ARRANGEMENTS ASSURE SPAIN THE RETURN OF
ITS INVESTMENT IN THE RICH PHOSPHATE DEPOSITS IN NORTHERN
SPANISH SAHARA.4

KING HASSAN, MEANWHILE, RETURNED TO RABAT ON SUNDAY

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AFTER MORE THAN A MONTH IN SOUTHERN MOROCCO DIRECTING HIS CAMPAIGN FOR THE TERRITORY. HE IS EXPECTED TO ATTEND CEREMONIES IN RABAT ON TUESDAY CELEBRATING THE 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF MOROCCO'S INDEPENDENCE. 4

HASSAN MIGHT USE THE OCCASION TO OUTLINE HIS NEXT STEPS ON THE SAHARAN QUESTION. {CONFIDENTIAL}4

2. PAKISTAN: THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT IS PLEASED BY GENERAL ZIA UR-RAHMAN'S OVERTHROW~~N~~ OF GENERAL MUSHARRAF IN BANGLADESH. 4

MUSHARRAF'S COUP HAD~~N~~ DISTRUBED THE PAKISTANIS. THEY THOUGHT MUSHARRAF SHARED THE PRO-INDIAN ORIENTATION OF THE LATE PRESIDENT MUJIB RATHER THAN THE PRO-PAKISTANI, PRO-CHINESE, AND PRO-WEST OUTLOOK ATTRIBUTED TO GENERAL ZIA AND TO FORMER PRESIDENT MUSHTAQ~~E~~4

MANY BENGALIES AND INDIANS ALSO SEEMED TO REGARD MUSHARRAF AS PRO-INDIAN. 4

THE PAKISTANIS ARE AS UNCERTAIN AS EVERYONE ELSE ABOUT THE COURSE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS WILL NOW TAKE IN BANGLADESH.

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AND CONSEQUENTLY THEY ARE BEING CAREFUL, WAITING TO SEE IF
THE NEW REGIME MOVES TO REAFFIRM MUSHTAQE'S DECISION TO SEND
AN AMBASSADOR TO ISLAMABAD.4

PAKISTANI OFFICIALS DO NOT EXPECT INDIA TO INTERVENE
MILITARILY IN BANGLADESH IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. THE
PAKISTANIS THINK INDIA WOULD DO SO ONLY IF THERE WERE AN
OUTBREAK OF MUSLIM-HINDU STRIFE IN BANGLADESH AND A FLIGHT
OF HINDUS TO INDIA.4

ISLAMABAD IS AS SUSPICIOUS AS EVER OF DELHI. THE
PAKISTANIS BELIEVE THAT OVER THE LONGER RUN THE INDIANS
MIGHT TAKE STEPS TO INDUCE A HINDU EXODUS FROM BANGLADESH
IN ORDER TO HAVE A PRETEXT FOR INTERVENTION.4

PEKING, MEANWHILE, HAS REPORTEDLY TOLD PAKISTANI OFFICIALS
THAT IT VIEWS GENERAL ZIA WITH SATISFACTION, ALTHOUGH IT IS
NOT SURE YET WHETHER HE WILL REMAIN IN POWER. THE OFFICIAL
CHINESE NEWS AGENCY RECENTLY PORTRAYED ZIA'S TAKEOVER IN A
FAVORABLE LIGHT.4

SAUDI ARABIA, WHICH ALONG WITH CHINA AND PAKISTAN

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RECOGNIZED THE MUSHTAQUE REGIME, IS SAID TO BE TAKING A
WAIT-AND-SEE APPROACH TO ZIA. RIYADH, ACCORDING TO

OFFICIAL, HAS INDICATED THAT IF THERE WERE A SHIFT IN DACCA BACK TOWARD A MORE SECULAR. "MUJIBIST" REGIME, SAUDI ARABIA WOULD NOT SEND AN AMBASSADOR OR PROVIDE FINANCIAL AID. {CONFIDENTIAL} E-2 IMPDET-H

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE BRIEF 177-75-4

ARGENTINA: PRESIDENT PERON, RELEASED FROM THE HOSPITAL AFTER ALMOST TWO WEEKS OF ISOLATION, IS FACING A REQUEUED DRIVE FROM WITHIN HER PARTY AND GOVERNMENT TO STEP ASIDE, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY.⁴

INTERIOR MINISTER ROBLEDO ALMOST CERTAINLY URGED THIS COURSE OF ACTION DURING A MEETING WITH HER ON NOVEMBER 13, WHEN SHE FINALLY RESPONDED TO CABINET REQUESTS FOR CONSULTATIONS. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTING, SENATE LEADERS HAD EARLIER TOLD ROBLEDO--GENERALLY VIEWED AS THE GOVERNMENT'S CHIEF COORDINATOR--THAT THEY WOULD EASE THEIR ATTACKS ON THE ADMINISTRATION BRIEFLY TO GIVE HIM TIME TO PREVAIL UPON PERON.⁴

THE SENATORS APPARENTLY WOULD BE SATISFIED IF SHE WOULD AGREE TO TAKE ANOTHER LEAVE OF ABSENCE OR A LONG GRIP ABROAD. THIS WOULD ALLOW ONE OF THEIR OWN, SENATE PRESIDENT LUDER, TO ASSUME THE DUTIES OF THE PRESIDENCY, AS HE DID DURING HER LAST LEAVE. THIS WOULD BE ONLY AN INTERIM SOLUTION, BUT THE MILITARY WOULD PROBABLY BACK IT, AS THEY DID PREVIOUSLY.⁴

PRESIDENTIAL LOYALISTS HAVE OTHER WORRIES AS WELL. THEY ARE

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TRYING TO PLAY DOWN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RALLY THIS WEEK BY SUPPORTERS OF BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE GOVERNOR CALABRO, A LEADER OF PERONISTS OPPOSED TO THE PRESIDENT. THE US EMBASSY REPORTS AN ENTHUSIASTIC CROWD OF ABOUT 30,000 TURNED OUT IN LA PLATA, THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL, TO HEAR CALABRO EXCORIATE THE ADMINISTRATION AND BELITTLE THE DECISION TO EXPEL HIM FROM PERONIST PARTY RANKS. THE OFFICIAL PERONIST NEWSPAPER, ON THE OTHER HAND, CLAIMS ONLY 12,000 SHOWED UP, AND AN ORTHODOX PERONIST CONGRESSIONAL LEADER TERMED CALABRO'S REMARKS "SUBVERSIVE." CALABRO'S FOLLOWING SEEKS TO BE GROWING: THE LONGER THE DISCREDITED PRESIDENT REMAINS IN OFFICE, THE MORE ADHERENTS THE GOVERNOR IS LIKELY TO ACQUIRE. {CONFIDENTIAL}

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EAST ASIA BRIEF 177-75.4

1. VIETNAM: THE DECISION TO CONVENE THE NORTH-SOUTH CONFERENCE ON REUNIFICATION NOW MEETING IN SAIGON INDICATES THAT HANOI IS READY TO PROCEED SWIFTLY ON FORMALLY JOINING THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE PROCESS COULD BE COMPLETED AS EARLY AS NEXT SPRING.4

THE CONFERENCE WILL BE A COSMETIC EXERCISE, GIVING THE APPEARANCE OF MUTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN "NORTHERNERS" AND "SOUTHERNERS" TO WHAT HAS BEEN A POLITICAL REALITY SINCE THE COLLAPSE OF THE FORMER GOVERNMENT LAST SPRING. VIETNAM HAS ALREADY EXPERIENCED DE FACTO REUNIFICATION UNDER A SINGLE PARTY AND MILITARY STRUCTURE, WITH HANOI MAKING ALL THE IMPORTANT ADMINISTRATIVE, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL DECISIONS.4

HEADING EACH OF THE DELEGATIONS ARE SENIOR PARTY OFFICIALS WHO ARE RANKING MEMBERS OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE POLITBURO. TROUNG CHINH, THE POLITBURO'S SECOND-RANKING MEMBER AND HEAD OF NORTH VIETNAM'S NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, IS REPRESENTING THE NORTH, WHILE PHAM HUNG, THE FOURTH-RANKING

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MEMBER ON THE POLITBURO AND THE PARTY'S CHIEF IN THE SOUTH
 LEADS SOUTH VIETNAM'S 25-MEMBER DELEGATION.⁴

ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT, THE CONFERENCE
 WILL FORMULATE PLANS FOR A NEW NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND NEW
 "COMMON" STATE ORGANS. THE FORMULATION SUGGESTS THAT
 HANOI INTENDS TO USE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT
 STRUCTURE AS A MODEL AND EXPAND ESTABLISHED LEGISLATIVE
 AND EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATIONS TO INCLUDE SOUTHERNERS. SOUTHERNERS
 WILL UNDOUBTEDLY ALSO BE APPOINTED TO POSITIONS IN EXECUTIVE
 MINISTRIES AND COMMISSIONS. THE ELECTIONS PROPOSED ARE FOR
 A NEW COUNTRYWIDE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. THESE ELECTIONS ARE
 INTENDED TO SERVE AS A NATIONWIDE PLEBISCITE, REFLECTING
 THE SO-CALLED "NATIONAL WILL" OF THE PEOPLE FOR A REUNIFIED
 STATE. IN REALITY, THE ASSEMBLY IN THE NORTH HAS NO POWER
 AND MERELY RUBBER STAMPS THE BIDDING OF THE POLITBURO AND
 THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. THE IMPRESSION LEFT BY THE ANNOUNCE-
 MENT IS THAT THE ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD SOON.⁴

SINCE THE COMMUNIST VICTORY LAST APRIL, LEADERS IN

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BOTH ZONES HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE ULTIMATE GOAL IS TO ESTABLISH A REUNIFIED VIETNAM. THERE HAVE BEEN MIXED SIGNS, HOWEVER, ON HOW RAPIDLY THIS PROCESS WOULD OCCUR AND WHAT FORM IT WOULD TAKE. ONE REASON FOR THE CONFUSION WAS THE RAPIDITY OF THE COMMUNIST MILITARY VICTORY, WHICH CAUGHT THE LEADERSHIP POLITICALLY OFF GUARD. AT THE TIME OF SAIGON'S COLLAPSE, HANOI ALMOST CERTAINLY HAD NO TIMETABLE FOR REUNIFICATION.4

MOST OF THE EARLY INDICATIONS FOLLOWING SAIGON'S FALL POINTED TO A GRADUAL PROCESS OF REUNIFICATION, WHICH MANY SOURCES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF VIETNAM MAINTAINED MIGHT TAKE AT LEAST SEVERAL YEARS. THE COMMUNISTS THEMSELVES ADDED TO SUCH SPECULATION BY PRESSING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS FOR DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF THE SOUTHERN PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT, BY MAINTAINING THAT ECONOMIC AID WOULD HAVE TO BE PROVIDED SEPARATELY FOR EACH STATE AND BY AN EFFORT LAST SUMMER TO GAIN SEPARATE MEMBERSHIP IN THE UN FOR BOTH VIETNAMS.4

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STATEMENTS BY COMMUNIST OFFICIALS, IN PARTICULAR SOUTHERN COMMUNIST LEADERS, ALSO SEEMED TO SUGGEST THAT REUNIFICATION WOULD PROCEED GRADUALLY TO PERMIT TIME TO OVERCOME THE SEVERE ECONOMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS BROUGHT ON BY THE SUDDEN COLLAPSE OF THE FORMER GOVERNMENT. FINALLY, THE COMMUNISTS ORIGINALLY INDICATED THAT THE MILITARY MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES SET UP TO ADMINISTER THE SOUTH WERE ONLY TEMPORARY AND WOULD GIVE WAY TO THE TYPE OF CIVILIAN COALITION GOVERNMENT LONG CALLED FOR BY THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT.4

BY LATE SUMMER, HOWEVER, SIGNS OF A "GRADUALIST" APPROACH TO REUNIFICATION BEGAN TO DISAPPEAR. PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY VIETNAMESE LEADERS CAREFULLY AVOIDED SUGGESTIONS OF AN INDEPENDENT SOUTHERN REGIME OF INDEFINITE DURATION. THE ONCE-PROMISED CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION NEVER MATERIALIZED AND, PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANTLY, NO FOREIGN STATES, INCLUDING NORTH VIETNAM'S CLOSEST ALLIES, WERE PERMITTED TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN SAIGON. MOREOVER, HANOI'S

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CONTROL OVER THE ECONOMY WAS MADE MORE EXPLICIT BY LINKING THE NEW SOUTH VIETNAMESE CURRENCY TO THAT OF THE NORTH AND BY SPECIFIC AND PUBLIC REFERENCES TO THE INCLUSION OF THE SOUTH IN A REVISED FIVE-YEAR PRODUCTION PLAN.⁴

STARTING IN JUNE AND POSSIBLY LASTING INTO SEPTEMBER, SENIOR SOUTHERN AND NORTHERN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING AT TIMES PARTY CHIEF LE DUAN, HELD A SERIES OF MEETINGS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. IT SEEMS ENTIRELY PLAUSIBLE THAT HANOI'S DECISION TO MOVE AHEAD WITH REUNIFICATION WAS REVEALED AND PROCEDURAL MATTERS WORKED OUT DURING THE COURSE OF THESE SESSIONS.⁴

THE MOST SIGNIFICANT QUESTION, HOWEVER, IS NOT WHEN BUT WHY HANOI DECIDED TO MOVE AWAY FROM A SCENARIO THAT SEEMED TO PROVIDE FOR A SEPARATE SOUTHERN ADMINISTRATION FOR SOME TIME, PERHAPS FOR SEVERAL YEARS. THE QUESTION WAS PROBABLY A MATTER OF CONSIDERABLE DEBATE IF NOT CONTENTION WITHIN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP. A SEPARATE SOUTHERN REGIME PRESENTED BOTH ADVANTAGES AND PROBLEMS FOR HANOI. MANY DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS IN HANOI,

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FOR INSTANCE, THOUGHT THAT THE "GRADUALIST" APPROACH WOULD PREVAIL, IN PART BECAUSE NORTH VIETNAM BELIEVED A FAÇADE OF SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE WOULD HELP ATTRACT AID, TRADE, AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT. HANOI APPARENTLY DECIDED, HOWEVER, THAT ANY DIPLOMATIC OR ECONOMIC BENEFITS TO BE DERIVED FROM TWO VIETNAMS WOULD BE OUTWEIGHED BY THE PROBLEMS FLOWING FROM SUCH A STRATEGY. 4

THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DOUBTLESSLY HAVE BEEN SUSPICIOUS OF PEKING'S APPARENT PREFERENCE FOR A GRADUAL APPROACH TO REUNIFICATION, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF A DIRECT CHINESE ~~■~~ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE HANOI'S DECISION. // MOREOVER THERE ARE SOME INDICATIONS THAT MOSCOW HAS BEEN ATTEMPTING TO EXPLOIT NORTH VIETNAM'S SENSITIVIES ON THIS SCORE BY WARNING OF CHINESE "MEDDLING" IN THE SOUTH AND THE PROSPECT OF A CHINESE DIPLOMATIC MISSION'S GAINING DIRECT ACCESS TO THE SAIGON AREA'S LARGE CHINESE POPULATION. GIVEN THE PRESENT UNEASY STATE OF SINO-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE MAY HAVE REACHED THE SAME CONCLUSION WITHOUT SUCH ~~■~~SELF-SERVING

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HELP FROM MOSCOW. //

HANOI'S SUSPICIONS REGARDING FOREIGN INTERFERENCE ARE RELATED TO A FAR MORE FUNDAMENTAL DOMESTIC CONCERN--MAINTAINING TOTAL CONTROL OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN THE SOUTH. WITH THE END OF THE WAR, THE QUESTION OF THE POLITICAL ROLES TO BE PLAYED BY SOUTHERN ELEMENTS, PREVIOUSLY CONFINED TO FRONT GROUPS OR THE MANAGEMENT OF LOCAL PROBLEMS, BECAME A PRESSING ISSUE FOR HANOI--ONE THAT IMPACTED DIRECTLY ON THE REUNIFICATION QUESTION. 4

ALTHOUGH HANOI FIRMLY CONTROLS THE SOUTHERN SEGMENT OF THE LAO DONG PARTY, A SEPARATE SOUTHERN REGIME COULD, OVER TIME, ONLY ENCOURAGE INDEPENDENT SOUTHERN TENDENCIES. STATEMENTS BY SOUTHERN LEADERS SHORTLY AFTER THE FALL OF SAIGON SUGGEST THAT THEY EXPECTED TO PLAY LEADING ROLES IN A SEPARATE SOUTHERN ADMINISTRATION. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN REPORTS OF SOUTHERN COMMUNIST RESENTMENT OVER THE HEAVY-HANDEDNESS OF NORTHERN CADRE SENT SOUTH IN RECENT MONTHS TO ADMINISTER THE COUNTRY. 4

ASIDE FROM SUCH UNREALIZED EXPECTATIONS AND BRUISED

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IP FILES #
 SOUTHERN SENSITIVITIES, WE LACK EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS HIGH-LEVEL
 NORTH-SOUTH DIFFERENCES ON THE REUNIFICATION ISSUE. HANOI'S
 DESIRE TO LIMIT THE POTENTIAL GROWTH OF VESTED SOUTHERN
 INTEREST IN POLITICAL AUTONOMY IS PROBABLY A MAJOR FACTOR
 BEHIND THE NORTH'S DECISION TO MOVE AHEAD.⁴

THERE ARE TENTATIVE INDICATIONS THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
 WILL CONVENE THEIR FIRST PARTY CONGRESS ~~IN~~ OVER 15 YEARS SOME-
 TIME EARLY NEXT YEAR TO PUT THE CAPSTONE ON THE REUNIFICATION
 PROCESS. THE CONGRESS, WHICH PROBABLY WOULD BE HELD ~~IN~~ SHORTLY
 AFTER THE ELECTION OF A JOINT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE ANNOUNCE-
 MENT OF FORMAL REUNIFICATION, MAY HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE
 QUESTION OF SOUTHERN POLITICAL EQUITIES.⁴

ONE MOVE THE CONGRESS SEEMS LIKELY TO MAKE IS THE
 EXPANSION OF THE POLITBURO AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE BY
 ADDING MEMBERS IDENTIFIED WITH THE SOUTHERN PARTY APPARATUS.
 SUCH A STEP WOULD NOT DO AWAY WITH THE PROBLEM OF SOUTHERN
 RESENTMENT. THE ABSORPTION OF SOUTHERN CADRE INTO THE
 NORTHERN PARTY AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE IS BOUND TO REMAIN

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A SENSITIVE POLITICAL ISSUE FOR YEARS TO COME. {SECRET}

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